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2

Nearly 30 years ago, the United States Supreme Court prohibited habeas corpus review of
search-and-seizure claims whenever the state provided adequate procedures, no matter how
erroneous the substantive decision may have been.1 A wave of critical commentary followed,2
but in recent years this anomaly in habeas corpus practice has gone almost entirely unexamined
despite dramatic changes in the law governing both the Fourth Amendment and habeas corpus
itself.
This article does two things. First, it reviews the history of collateral review of searchand-seizure claims,3 concluding that the basis for current doctrine was once stronger than its
early critics admitted. Second, this article shows that subsequent changes in both the
exclusionary rule, and in habeas practice generally, render current doctrine ripe for reassessment.

1

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474-95 (1976) .

2

Numerous scholars have argued that no legitimate basis exists for treating search-andseizure claims differently from other constitutional claims on collateral review, or that whatever
differences may exist do not justify existing doctrine. Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73
Minn L. Rev. 247, 287 (1988); Philip Halpern, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Mapp
Exclusionary Rule After Stone v. Powell, 82 Colum. L. Rev.1, 31-34 (1982); Richard A.
Michael, The “New” Federalism and the Burger Court’s Deference to the States in Federal
Habeas Proceedings, 64 Iowa L. Rev. 233, 253 (1979); Brenda Soloff, Litigation and
Relitigation: The Uncertain Status of Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 6 Hofstra L.
Rev. 297, 309-15 (1978); Mark Tushnet, Constitutional and Statutory Analyses in the Law of
Federal Jurisdiction, 25 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1301, 1316-18 (1978); Larry W. Yackle, The Future of
Habeas Corpus: Reflections on Teague v. Lane and Beyond: The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 2331, 2399-2408, 2417 (1993); cf. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 557-60
(1982) (treating Fourth Amendment claims identically to other constitutional claims in
considering the retroactive effect of new rules to defendants still in the direct review process
when the new rule is announced).
3

This article uses the terms habeas review and collateral review interchangeably to refer to
a constitutional challenge to a criminal conviction after it becomes final. The Court has defined
a conviction as final where “a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of
appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari
finally denied.” Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6 (1987).
3

Surprisingly, given the rich literature exploring the history of habeas corpus case law,4
there has been remarkably little historical analysis directed at the judicial treatment of collateral
search-and-seizure claims. Part I of this Article observes that habeas review of Fourth
Amendment claims has been the exception rather than the rule. Until the early 1960s, the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule was not treated as a constitutional principle, and thus state
prisoners had no basis to raise collateral search-and-seizure claims. Mapp v. Ohio,5 decided in
1961, held that the Constitution does compel a state court to exclude illegally-seized evidence,
and for about a decade thereafter, the federal courts entertained habeas challenges grounded in
the Fourth Amendment.6 Had no one dissented, the plain language of the habeas statute may
have justified the use of the writ to remedy search-and-seizure errors. Almost immediately,
however, dissenters articulated detailed, analytical, and arguably persuasive counter-arguments.
Initially, the U.S. Supreme Court brushed off, without fully engaging, these points.7 But by

4

See, e.g., Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 575, 582-630 (1993);
James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct
Review Parity, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1997, 2057-81 (1992); Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal
Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 579, 602 (1982); Paul Bator, Finality in
Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 465-77
(1963).
5

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961).

6

Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974);
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Whiteley
v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Harris v. Nelson,
394 U.S. 286 (1969); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S.
234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443,
452-53 (1965) (direct appeal, but suggesting that habeas review would be open to a Fourth
Amendment claim that was not waived in state court).
7

See infra I.C.
4

1976, the dissenting voices had won out, and the Court has rarely looked back.8
Although no definitive case emerges, the historical basis for excluding search-and-seizure
claims from federal habeas review is stronger than prior commentators have recognized. But this
Article does not defend current doctrine. Even assuming that it was once justifiable, a new case
has emerged against it. Part II explains that, by the early 1990s, the Court had rejected each of
the broad grounds – federal-state comity, potential innocence, and the extra-constitutional nature
of the exclusionary remedy – that might have distinguished collateral Fourth Amendment claims
from habeas review of other constitutional challenges.
After these decisions, the only potential justification for distinguishing search-and-seizure
claims was that collateral enforcement posed especially high costs and low benefits. Part III of
this Article shows that changes in both the exclusionary rule and federal habeas corpus doctrine
have dramatically altered that cost/benefit analysis. As of 1976, a petitioner could seek the writ
at virtually any time9; existing law required a federal habeas court to review virtually any
constitutional claim de novo10 and, if the police violated the Fourth Amendment, the court was

8

See infra I.D&E.

9

A federal habeas rule enabled a court to dismiss the case if the passage of time had
prejudiced the state’s ability to respond to the petition. But this rule did not apply to prejudice
that might accrue to the state were a re-trial required. See infra at n. 116.
10

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1976) (“since Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443
(1953), it has been the rule that the federal habeas petitioner who claims he is detained pursuant
to a final judgment of a state court in violation of the United States Constitution is entitled to
have the federal habeas court make its own independent determination of his federal claim,
without being bound by the determination on the merits of that claim reached in the state
proceedings.”); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 425-26 (1963) (requiring de novo federal habeas
review of defaulted claims unless petition deliberately by-passed an opportunity for state court
review in order to preserve the claim for federal court).
5

compelled to grant the writ unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.11
Subsequently, the Court has narrowed the scope of the exclusionary rule by adopting a good faith
exception,12 and restricted federal habeas corpus review in several important ways.13 In addition,
Congress enacted the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,14 (1) imposing a
strict one-year statute of limitations15 and (2) prohibiting federal courts from granting the writ
unless the state decision involved an unreasonable application of existing federal law.16
These developments significantly lowered the costs of enforcing the exclusionary rule in
federal habeas corpus proceedings. The difficulties posed by long-delayed fact-finding have
been virtually eliminated. And the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, combined with
the AEDPA’s reasonableness standard of review, ensure that the writ would be granted only in
those search-and-seizure cases in which police conduct diverges most widely from settled law
and is thus most likely to be deterred by the threat of collateral review. This Part thus concludes
that Stone should be overruled.17

11

Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 567-69 & n.13 (1971) (applying exclusionary rule on
habeas over claim of harmless error even though police officers had obtained a warrant).
12

See infra III.B.1.

13

See infra III.B.2.a-d.

14

PL 104-132 (S 735) (Apr. 24, 1996). This Article refers to the Anti-terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 interchangeably as the “AEDPA” and the “1996 Act.”
15

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

16

28 U.S.C. §2254(d).

17

The legislative history of the 1996 Act is silent on whether Congress intended it to alter
the Stone rule. The case was cited only to support the argument that state courts could
competently address federal constitutional issues. See 141 CONG. REC. S7833 (daily ed. June
7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
6

Part IV responds to the likely criticism that this Article pays inadequate attention to
traditional notions of statutory interpretation. This Part contends that those interpretative
methods yield inherently uncertain results, and thus one focusing exclusively on the statutory
language and legislative history could reasonably conclude that, in enacting the AEDPA,
Congress either did, or did not, intend to disturb current doctrine. Those who claim definitively
that the AEDPA preserves the existing rule make serious errors in their reading of either Stone v.
Powell,18 the case that prohibited federal habeas courts from reaching most Fourth Amendment
claims, or the legislative history of the 1996 Act. More importantly, Stone purported to be a
constitutional case, not one interpreting the habeas statute. Traditional methods of statutory
interpretation should therefore play little, if any, role in assessing Stone’s continuing utility and
vitality.
I. Federal Habeas Corpus Review of Fourth Amendment Claims
Collateral review of search and seizure claims has progressed through three distinct
periods. Prior to 1961, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule did not apply to the states. As a
result, a state prisoner had no federal ground to invoke habeas jurisdiction when illegally seized

Habeas petitioners have begun to argue as a matter of statutory interpretation that habeas
courts should now apply the terms of the 1996 Act, rather than the Stone rule, to collateral
search-and-seizure claims. Most courts, however, continue to apply Stone. Hampton v. Wyant,
296 F.3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding 1996 Act not intended to overrule Stone); Herrera v.
LeMaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 n.2 (10th Cir. 2000) (same); Newman v. Hopkins, 6 F. Supp. 2d
1111, 1116 (D. Neb. 1998) (assuming, without discussion, that Stone continues to apply); but see
Carlson v. Ferguson, 9 F. Supp.2d 654, 656 (S.D. W.V. 1998) (holding that standard of review in
the 1996 Act replaces Stone’s full-and-fair-hearing requirement); Cabrera v. Hinsley, 540 U.S.
873 (2003) (denying certiorari where petitioner argued that Stone “should have been understood
as permitting relief when state proceedings do not satisfy [the 1996 Act’s] standards” 2003 WL
22428412 at *12-26 (Jun. 30, 2003) (petition for certioari).
18

428 U.S. 465 (1976) .
7

evidence was used to support a conviction. That changed in 1961 with the Court’s decision in
Mapp v. Ohio,19 which applied the exclusionary rule to the states.20 In 1976, the Court prohibited
habeas review of Fourth Amendment claims unless the state failed to provide a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the claim in the direct criminal process.21 This Part summarizes the federal
courts’ specific treatment of Fourth Amendment claims arising in habeas corpus proceedings.
A. Collateral Review of Fourth Amendment Claims in the Pre-Mapp Era
In the late 1800s, the United States Supreme Court first excluded illegally obtained
evidence.22 Not until the early 1920s, however, did the Court definitively hold that the fruits of
illegal searches and seizures could not be used to convict.23
Although the federal exclusionary rule was well established by the mid-twentieth century,
federal habeas review of state court search-and-seizure claims remained entirely unexplored. In
1948, the Court held in Wolf v. Colorado24 that the Fourth Amendment applied to state, as well
as federal, law enforcement authorities25 but that the exclusionary rule did not.26 To be sure,

19

367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961).

20

Id. at 660.

21

See infra I.D.

22

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).

23

Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); see Silverthorn Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
24

338 U.S. 22 (1949).

25

Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27-28.

26

Id. at 33.
8

many states had their own similar rules.27 But an error of state law alone could not trigger federal
habeas review.28 As a result, through the 1950s, a state prisoner generally could not bring a
collateral search-and-seizure claim.29
B. The Impact of the Mapp Decision: Constitutionalizing the Exclusionary Rule on
Collateral Search-and-Seizure Claims
In 1961, the Court decided Mapp v. Ohio,30 which required state courts to exclude
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.31 Not surprisingly, by the mid-1960s,
state prisoners were filing federal habeas corpus petitions collaterally attacking their detentions
on Fourth Amendment grounds.32 In its 1965 decision in Linkletter v. Walker,33 the Court first
27

Id. at 33-38; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961).

28

The federal habeas statute limits jurisdiction to claims arising under “the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
29

Four years after Wolf, the Court held that, wholly apart from the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule, the Due Process Clause required a state to exclude evidence if the
government’s conduct “shocked the conscience.” Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73
(1952).
30

367 U.S. 643 (1961).

31

Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655-60.

32

See, e.g., Fixel v. Wainwright 492 F.2d 480, 485 (5th Cir. 1974); United States ex rel.
Angelet v. Fay, 333 F.2d 12 (2nd Cir. 1964); Kuhl v. United States, 370 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir.,
1966); Hall v. Warden, 313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1963); Walker v. Peppersack, 316 F.2d 119 (4th
Cir. 1963); California v. Hurst, 325 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1963); Gaitan v. United States, 317 F.2d
494 (10th Cir. 1963); Linkletter v. Walker, 323 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963), aff’d, 381 U.S. 618
(1965); U. S. ex rel. Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz, 312 F.Supp. 11, 14 (D.C.Pa. 1969); U. S. ex rel.
Spero v. McKendrick, 266 F.Supp. 718, 723 (D.C.N.Y. 1967); Sisk v. Lane, 331 F.2d 12 (7th Cir.
1964); Painten v. Massachusetts. 252 F.Supp. 851 (D.C.Mass. 1966); Bates v. Dickson 226
F.Supp. 983, 993 (D.C.Cal. 1964); Benson v. People of State of Cal. 336 F.2d 791, 794
(C.A.Cal.1964).
33

381 U.S. 618 (1965).
9

addressed such a case, holding that the exclusionary rule did not apply retroactively to a state
case that had become final before the Court decided Mapp.34
Linkletter did not address whether post-Mapp search-and-seizure claims could be
attacked collaterally, but for the next decade, the analysis in that opinion provided the ingredients
for the arguments on both sides of the debate. Some assumed that Fourth Amendment claims
and the exclusionary rule should be treated on habeas like any other constitutional claim and its
attendant remedy.35 Others saw substantial differences in the nature of search-and-seizure
claims.36 The following sub-parts describe the arguments on both sides.
1. The Case in Favor of Federal Habeas Review of Search-and-Seizure Claims
By addressing retroactivity without discussing the scope of the writ, the Linkletter Court
arguably assumed that federal habeas review would be available for post-Mapp Fourth
Amendment claims. In the early 1960s, the notion that constitutional holdings might not apply
retroactively was novel,37 and the Court arguably would not have created a new body of doctrine
if it did not believe that Fourth Amendment claims would otherwise be open to collateral review.

34

Id. at 639-40 (defining a case as final if the U.S. Supreme Court had denied certiorari or
the time for filing a petition had expired).
35

Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme Court 1964 Term-Forward: The High Court, The Great
Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56, 78 & n.73 (1965).
36

The Court quoted Linkletter in its decision holding that habeas review would generally be
closed to search-and-seizure claims. Stone, 428 U.S. at 486 (quoting Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 637).
37

Before deciding Linkletter, "both the common law and [the Court’s] own decisions
recognized a general rule of retrospective effect for the constitutional decisions of this Court ...
subject to [certain] limited exceptions." Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 507 (1973); Linkletter,
381 U.S. at 628 (explaining that “heretofore, without discussion, we have applied new
constitutional rules to cases finalized before the promulgation of the rule”).
10

Further, the Linkletter Court placed great weight on Mapp’s breaking with prior precedent.38
That concern, of course, would not apply to post-Mapp petitions in which state courts could not
have legitimately relied on Wolf in failing to exclude illegally seized evidence.
Federal habeas courts generally assumed jurisdiction over state court search-and-seizure
claims without pausing to consider whether Fourth Amendment claims should be treated
differently.39 In 1964, a California Federal District Court expressed the general sentiment well:
“Since the exclusionary rule is itself a Constitutional dictate, the question of illegal search and
seizure by state authorities of evidence for use in a state criminal trial is cognizable by the federal
courts on application for a writ of habeas corpus, unless there is a state post-conviction remedy
still available to the prisoner at the time of filing the application in the federal court.”40
For the most part, the U.S. Supreme Court appears to have adhered to that same
reasoning, addressing several Fourth Amendment habeas cases without engaging the analytic
arguments for and against collateral review.41 During this period, Kaufman v. United States,42
stands as the Court’s lone significant attempt to grapple with the reviewability issue. There, a

38

Id. at 636 (“The thousands of cases that were finally decided on Wolf cannot be
obliterated. The 'particular conduct, private and official,' must be considered. Here 'prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly' have 'become vested.' And
finally, 'public policy in the light of the nature both of the (Wolf doctrine) and of its previous
application' must be given its proper weight.”); id. at 638 (contrasting retroactive overturning of
cases involving coerced confessions because rule was well established at the time of those cases).
39

Supra n. 6.

40

Bates v. Dickson 226 F.Supp. 983, 993 (D.C.Cal. 1964); Benson v. People of State of
Cal. 336 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir..1964).
41

Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 239 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).

42

394 U.S. 217 (1969).
11

federal prisoner sought collateral review of a search-and-seizure issue, and the government
argued that habeas review should be foreclosed because Fourth Amendment claims are “of a
different nature from denials of other constitutional rights.”43 Where most constitutional errors
undermine the reliability of the trial outcome, cases infected by Fourth Amendment error are
likely to be more accurate because trustworthy evidence that would have been suppressed is
presented to the jury. Rather than enhancing reliability, the government argued, the exclusionary
rule serves a “prophylactic” purpose that is “intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment
violations by law enforcement officers.”44 This deterrent function, the prosecution claimed, was
adequately served by enforcing the rule at trial and on direct appeal. Adding habeas review
would needlessly tax the judicial system without meaningfully deterring unlawful searches and
seizures.45
The Court rejected this argument, declaring that “the availability of collateral remedies is
necessary to inure the integrity of proceedings at and before trial where constitutional rights are
at stake.”46 The Court never explained, however, why the differences between Fourth
Amendment and other constitutional claims did not justify a different calculus. Instead, it first
cited to prior cases that applied the writ to search-and-seizure claims. But those cases had not
addressed the arguments advanced by the government. Second, the Court reasoned that
prohibiting collateral review of search-and-seizure claims would “exalt[] the value of finality in
43

Id. at 220.

44

Id. at 224.

45

Id. at 224.

46

Id. at 225-26 (explaining that “adequate protection of constitutional rights relating to the
criminal trial process requires the continuing availability of a mechanism for relief”).
12

criminal judgments at the expense of the interest of each prisoner in the vindication of his
constitutional rights.”47 Here, the Court cited cases that had explained the value of collateral
review and asserted that “[t]his pholosophy inheres in our recognition of state prisoners’ postconviction claims of illegal search and seizure.”48 But the cited cases involved suspect evidence
and, by excluding it, the court could directly address the constitutional violation. In Fourth
Amendment cases, by contrast, courts exclude undeniably probative evidence and do not directly
remedy the constitutional breach. The Kaufman Court never explained why this special character
of search-and-seizure claims should not alter its finality/rights-enforcement calculus.
To be sure, Justice Brennan emphasized that the exclusionary rule protects societal
interests, not just those of the defendant in a particular case.49 But that truism does not logically
lead to the conclusion that collateral enforcement of the rule sufficiently serves those interests to
justify the cost. As Judge Friendly argued two years after Kaufman, no unassailable principle of
justice compels a federal court to free a guilty state prisoner who had an “opportunity to litigate”
his claims on direct review in state court “even though he might have escaped deserved

47

Id. at 228. Justice Brennan, the author of the majority opinion in Kaufman was a member
of the majority in Linkletter where the Court found that finality interests did outweigh the interest
in providing a remedy for a search-and-seizure violation. Justice Black, in his dissent in
Kaufman argued that the same reasoning applied to all collateral relief. Id. at 239-40. Justice
Brennan disagreed, explaining that “[t]he availability of post-conviction relief serves
significantly to secure the integrity of proceedings at or before trial and on appeal. No such
service is performed by extending rights retroactively. Thus, collateral relief, unlike retroactive
relief, contributes to the present vitality of all constitutional rights whether or not they bear on
the integrity of the fact-finding process.” Id. at 229.

48

Id. at 228 (citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 394-96 (1963) (confession case) and Sanders
v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 5-6 91963) (due process concern that petitioner rendered
incompetent by involuntarily administered drugs)).
49

Id. at 229.
13

punishment in the first instance with a brighter lawyer or a different judge.”50 Justice Brennan
may have had the better of this argument, but his opinion in Kaufman did not compellingly make
the case.51

50

Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38
U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 157 (1970).
51

Post-Kaufman cases add nothing to the analytic argument for habeas review of Fourth
Amendment claims. Two of them, however, confirm that a majority of the Court had accepted
that search-and-seizure claims were, for the purposes of habeas review, indistinguishable from
other constitutional claims. First, in Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971), the Court granted
the writ, reversing a state court conviction in which an affidavit supporting an arrest warrant did
not establish probable cause. Id. at 579. Whiteley stands out from other cases that assume
jurisdiction over collateral search and seizure claims because two of the dissenters in Kaufmann,
Justices Harlan and Stewart, joined the Whiteley majority. In Kaufman, they had dissented,
arguing that federal courts should generally not collaterally review search-and-seizure claims. In
Whiteley, Harlan wrote the majority opinion, and Steward signed on, apparently believing that
the fight against collateral review of search-and-seizure claims had been lost. In concurring in
another search-and-seizure case denying habeas relief, Justice Stewart made this point explicitly.
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 54-55 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I ahere to the view
that the admission at trial of evidence acquired in alleged violation of Fourth Amendment
standards is not of itself sufficient ground for a collateral attack upon an otherwise valid criminal
conviction, state or federal. . . .But until the Court adopts that view, I regard myself as obligated
to consider the merits of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims in a case of this kind.
Upon that premise I join the opinion and judgment of the Court.”) Whether Justice Harlan agreed
that federal habeas should not extend to search-and-seizure claims in state court cases is
uncertain. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 304 n.1 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
In Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975), the Court granted certiorari to decide
whether a federal habeas court should review a Fourth Amendment claim, even though the
defendant had pled guilty. The Court had previously held that federal habeas courts could not
review post-guilty plea constitutional claims. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970)
(guilty plea entered pursuant to an unconstitutional statute may not be upset on habeas);
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (guilty plea influenced by prior coerced
confession may not be attacked on habeas); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 797-98
(1970) (guilty plea may not be attacked on habeas despite erroneous advice of counsel that
coerced confession would be admissible). In Lefkowitz, however, a state statute specifically
permitted post-plea review in state court, and the Court, in an opinion by Justice Stewart, held
that because state review was permitted, federal collateral review was also available. Leftkowitz,
420 U.S. at 291-92. As of 1975, then, the Court would not distinguish between Fourth
Amendment, and other constitutional, claims. As Justice Stewart explained for the Court, in
14

2. The Case Against Habeas Review of Fourth Amendment Claims
Just as Linkletter’s focus on pre-Mapp petitions led courts to assume that post-Mapp
search-and-seizure claims fell within the scope of the writ, Linkletter’s intricate analysis sowed
the seeds of alternative arguments that arose against federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment
claims. First, by prohibiting collateral review of pre-Mapp search-and-seizure claims, Linkletter
reinforced that the Court itself largely shaped the scope of habeas review.52 If it could effectively
bar collateral review of pre-Mapp cases, then it could prohibit review of post-Mapp claims as
well. Second, key aspects of Linkletter’s rationale for denying retroactive reliance on the
exclusionary rule also weighed against prospective collateral attacks:
(1) exclusionary rule claims hinder the truth-seeking process;
(2) collateral review would seriously tax the administration of justice because of the
pervasiveness and fact-intensiveness of search-and-seizure claims; and
(3) re-examination on habeas would add little to the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule.53

asserting a search-and seizure claim, a petitioner “has satisfied all the prerequisites for invoking
the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts. He is no less entitled to federal review of his
constitutional claim than is any other defendant who raises his claim in a timely fashion . . .” Id.
at 291-92 & nn. 8-9 (footnotes omitted).
52

See infra nn. 209-16.

53

Id. at 637 (deterrent purpose of exclusionary rule will not be served by freeing “guilty
victims” of fourth amendment violations); id. (“To make the rule of Mapp retrospective would
tax the administration of justice to the utmost. Hearings would have to be held on the
excludability of evidence long since destroyed, misplaced or deteriorated. If it is excluded, the
witnesses available at the time of the original trial will not be available or if located their
memory will be dimmed.”); id. at 638 (suggesting that reversing convictions based on an error
with “no bearing on guilt would seriously disrupt the administration of justice”); id. (contrasting
coerced confession cases that involve the admission of potentially unreliable evidence with
search-and-seizure cases where “there is no likelihood of unreliability”); id. at 639 (explaining
that each case in which a constitutional rule had been applied retroactively “went to the fairness
15

The first courts to question the propriety of collateral attacks on search-and-seizure
decisions were lower federal courts that refused to review federal prisoner petitions raising
Fourth Amendment claims collaterally that had not been raised in the direct criminal process.54
Most of these cases rested on the established rule that habeas could not be used as a substitute for
appeal.55 In Thornton v. United States,56 however, the D.C. Circuit presented a thorough-going
argument for denying collateral review to search-and-seizure claims.57 Although Judge
Leventhal’s opinion purportedly limited the court’s rationale to federal prisoners,58 his analysis
stands as the most persuasive argument for eliminating virtually all collateral search-and-seizure
litigation, whether the case arose in federal or state court.

of the trial – the very integrity of the fact-finding process. Here . . . the fairness of the trial is not
under attack.”).
54

Peters v. United States, 312 F.2d 481, 482 (8th Cir. 1963); United States v. Re, 372 F.2d
641 (2nd Cir. 1967); United States v. Jenkins, 281 F.2d 193 (3rd Cir. 1960); Armstead v. United
States, 318 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1963). Eisner v. Untied States 351 F.2d 55, 57 (6th Cir. 1965) De
Weeles v. United States, 372 F.2d 67 (7th Cir. 1967); Williams v. Untied States, 307 F.2d 366,
367 (9th Cir. 1962); but see United States v. Sutton, 321 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1963); Gaitan v.
Untied States, 317 F.2d 494 (10th Cir. 1963); but see U.S. v. Sutton, 321 F.2d 221, 222 (4th Cir.
1963) (holding that federal prisoner may collaterally challenge a denial of a search-and-seizure
suppression motion despite failing to file an appeal).
55

See, e.g., Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 179-80 (1947).

56

368 F.2d 822, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1966).

57

Judge Leventhal’s opinion is so persuasive because he convinces the reader that he
actually believes in the distinction between direct and collateral review of Fourth Amendment
claims. Id. at 826-27 (stressing the important purposes of the Fourth Amendment and the courts
long standing commitment to effective remedies). In contrast, Stone reads as if the exclusionary
rule should be discarded entirely were stare decisis not an issue. Stone, 428 U.S. at 490-94
(emphasizing costs of exclusionary rule and highlighting “the absence of supportive empirical
evidence” of the rule’s effectiveness).
58

Thornton, 368 F.2d at 828-29.
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Citing Linkletter, the D.C. Circuit held that absent special circumstances – such as
ineffective counsel or an inadequate opportunity to seek relief 59 – a court should not address the
merits of a Fourth Amendment claim on habeas.60 Judge Leventhal explained that “whether a
collateral attack is permissible” should turn on three factors:
(1) “the nature of the constitutional claim”;
(2) “[t]he effectiveness of the direct remedies”; and
(3) “the need for choices among competing considerations in quest of the ultimate goal of
achievement of justice.”61
In search-and-seizure cases, the court concluded that each factor weighed against collateral
review. The exclusionary rule powerfully and effectively enforced the Fourth Amendment pretrial, at trial, and on direct appeal. Little would be gained from further collateral enforcement.62
By contrast, habeas review carried a high cost because of the large number of hearings that
would be required to examine events about which memories had long faded; that most of these
petitions would ultimately fail made the cost that much more unjustifiable.63

59

Id. at 829.

60

Thornton v. United States, 368 F.2d 822, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Justice Harlan, joined in
dissent by Justice Stewart, made a similar argument in Kaufmann v. United States, 394 U.S. 217,
243 (1969) (“the Court once again . . . this Term imposes a burden on the judiciary and on
society at large, which results in no legitimate benefit to the petitioner and does nothing to serve
the interests of justice”).
61

Id. at 826.

62

Id. at 828 (explaining that “collateral attack would be of little if any weight in achieving
the pattern of lawful conduct by enforcement officials which is the objective of the exclusionary
rule”).
63

Id. at 827.
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Although these same administrative concerns exist with respect to, for example, collateral
claims of ineffective counsel or the failure to disclose evidence, habeas review is needed because
courts cannot effectively protect them during the direct proceedings.64 Perhaps more
importantly, a greater individual injustice occurs when adequate counsel is not provided, or
exculpatory evidence is withheld, than where a court fails to exclude illegally seized, but truthful
and probative, evidence.65 Under these circumstances, the court held, “there is no imperative to .
. . leav[e] no stone unturned, when exploration of all avenues of justice at the behest of individual
petitioners may impair judicial administration of the federal courts, as by making criminal
litigation interminable, and diverting resources of the federal judiciary.”66
Justice Brennan’s majority opinion in Kaufman rejected Thornton’s reasoning and
explicitly endorsed the opinion of Judge Skelly Wright, who dissented in Thornton, that habeas
review should be available to both state and federal prisoners for all constitutional claims.67 But
three justices dissented in Kaufman, advancing arguments that would soon influence a majority
of the Court. Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, would have adopted the Thornton
reasoning.68 Justice Black emphasized that the potential innocence of the petitioner should weigh
heavily in determining the availability of habeas relief.69 Because Fourth Amendment claims,
64

Id.

65

Id. at 827-28.

66

Id. at 26 (citing Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. at 182).

67

Kaufman, 394 U.S. at 230-31.

68

Kaufman, 394 U.S. at 242-43 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

69

Id. at 234 (Black, J. dissenting) (“It is this element of probable or possible innocence that
I think should be given weight in determining whether a judgment after conviction and appeal
18

unlike virtually all other constitutional claims, do not help ensure “that the trial would be a
reliable means of testing guilt,” Black believed that the writ should not reach them.70
Four years later, the Court took certiorari on a Fourth Amendment federal habeas claim.
Although a majority of the Court denied the claim on its merits, four justices argued that
collateral review should be foreclosed.71 Justice Powell began by reviewing the writ’s historic
purpose, which he contended did not include the re-litigation of issues decided by courts of
competent jurisdiction. The modern federal habeas corpus statutes, he argued, were not intended
to change that function.72 Nevertheless, he did not advocate a return to this narrow form of
habeas review so long as the petitioner’s claim cast doubt on his guilt.73
Although Justice Powell, like Justice Black before him, focused on the importance of a

and affirmance should be open to collateral attack, for the great historic role of the writ of habeas
corpus has been to insure the reliability of the guilt-determining process.”); id. at 241 (“In
collateral attacks whether by habeas corpus or by § 2255 proceedings, I would always require
that the convicted defendant raise the kind of constitutional claim that casts some shadow of a
doubt on his guilt.”); Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 574-75 (Black, J., dissenting).
70

Kaufman, 394 U.S. at 237-38 (Black, J. dissenting) (“The purpose of the exclusionary
rule, unlike most provisions of the Bill of Rights, does not include, even to the slightest degree,
the goal of insuring that the guilt-determining process be reliable.”).
71

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249 (1973) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(expressing agreement with dissenters in Kaufman); id. at 250 (Powell, J, concurring) (joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist and asserting that “federal collateral review of a state
prisoner’s Fourth Amendment claims . . . should be confined solely to the question of whether
the petitioner was provided a fair opportunity to raise and have adjudicated the question in state
courts”).
72

Id. at 252-56 (Powell, J., concurring).

73

Id. at 256 (Powell, J., concurring) (describing expansion of habeas for claims of
innocence as a “justifiable evolution of the use of habeas corpus”).
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claim of innocence,74 he also reiterated much of Judge Leventhal’s rationale in Thornton, arguing
that habeas review (1) clogs the courts75 and (2) imposes significant costs in terms of judicial
effort and the difficulty of delayed fact finding for both the collateral claim and any re-trial.76
These costs apply to any habeas claim, Powell recognized, but they are likely to be even more
pronounced in Fourth Amendment cases, because of the intensely factual nature of most searchand-seizure issues.77
Also following Thornton, Justice Powell reiterated that extending the exclusionary rule to
habeas would have at best an “anemic” incremental benefit. Where a prisoner collaterally attacks
a conviction, Powell argued, “the exclusionary rule retains its major liabilities while the asserted
benefit of the rule dissolves. For whatever deterrent function the rule may serve when applied on
trial and appeal becomes greatly attenuated when, months or years afterward, the claim surfaces

74

Id. at 256-58. Powell contemplated a wholesale revision of federal habeas, suggesting
that a claim of innocence might always be required. Id. at 265-66 (Powell, concurring) (“The
specific issue before us, and the only one that need be decided at this time, is the extent to which
a state prisoner may obtain federal habeas corpus review of a Fourth Amendment claim.
Whatever may be formulated as a more comprehensive answer to the important broader issues
(whether by clarifying legislation or in subsequent decisions). . .”). On the current Court, Justice
Scalia has made the same argument. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 720 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Prior opportunity to litigate an issue should be an
important equitable consideration in any habeas case, and should ordinarily preclude the court
from reaching the merits of a claim, unless it goes to the fairness of the trial process or to the
accuracy of the ultimate result.”).
75

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 260-61 (Powell, concurring); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545,
583-84 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“In the year ending June 30, 1978, almost 9,000 of the
prisoner actions filed were habeas corpus petitions.”).
76

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 261 (Powell, concurring) (citing Anthony Amsterdam, Search,
Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 378, 383-84 (1964)).
77

Id. at 263 (Powell, concurring).
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for collateral review.”78
C. The Court Rejects Collateral Review of Fourth Amendment Claims
In 1976, the Court decided Stone v. Powell,79 in effect adopting Judge Leventhal’s
argument in Thornton that absent special circumstances – which the Court described as the lack
of an opportunity for full and fair litigation in state court – search-and-seizure claims should not
be open to collateral attack.80 Justice Powell’s majority opinion in Stone was not as sweeping as
his concurrence in Schneckloth had been and, like Thornton, placed greater emphasis on the cost
of the exclusionary rule and habeas review than on the assumed guilt of a prisoner who relies
solely on a search-and-seizure claim.

78

Id. at 268-69 (Powell, concurring). In separate opinions, Powell also added additional
grounds for denying collateral review of Fourth Amendment claims, stressing the cost in terms of
(1) federal-state relations, Id. at 264 (Powell, concurring); Rose, 443 U.S. at 584-85 (Powell, J.,
dissenting), and (2) the educative and rehabilitative functions of the criminal law where finality is
long delayed. Id. at 584 (Powell, J., dissenting).
After Schneckloth, lower courts began to question the continued assumption that exclusionary
rule claims should be reviewed collaterally. For example, a New Jersey district court explained
that “[t]here is some question . . . whether the exclusion remedy for Fourth Amendment
violations ought to be viewed as of constitutional dimension for purposes of collateral attack by
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, where the constitutional claim has little or no bearing upon
the issue of guilt or innocence or upon the integrity of the fact-finding process, and where the
asserted deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule are likely to be so attenuated as no longer to
warrant its application. A majority of the Supreme Court, however, still views the receipt of
unconstitutionally-seized evidence at trial to be cognizable by petition for habeas corpus.” U. S.
ex rel. Petillo v. State of N. J. 400 F.Supp. 1152, 1190 (D.C.N.J. 1975)
79

428 U.S. 465 (1976).

80

Stone, 428 U.S. at 481-82 (holding “that where the State has provided an opportunity for
full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that a
state prisoner by granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial”).
21

The purpose of the exclusionary rule, the Court held, was to deter police misconduct.81
Although some language in the Court’s opinions had suggested that the rule also preserved the
integrity of the judicial process,82 the Court declared that rationale inconsistent with the many
recognized legitimate uses of illegally seized evidence. For example, the Court had refused to
exclude evidence from grand jury proceedings or trials in which the defendant’s own privacy
rights had not been violated.83 Although the impact on the integrity of the courts in admitting
illegally-seized evidence would have required exclusion in these situations, the Court justified
exceptions on the ground that the “incremental” deterrent effect of suppressing the evidence
would be “uncertain at best.”84 Given the recognized societal cost of excluding truthful,
probative evidence, the exclusionary rule, the Court had held, would be unjustifiable in these
situations.85
Stone held that this same rationale applied to collateral proceedings.86 Habeas review, the
Court noted, “often occur[s] years after the incarceration of the defendant.”87 Law enforcement
81

Id. at 486.

82

Id. at 484-86 (citing cases).

83

Id. at 484-86.

84

Id. at 487 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351 (1974); id. at 488 (“the
‘additional benefits of extending the rule’ to defendants other than the victim of the search or
seizure are outweighed by the ‘further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those
accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which
exposes the truth.’” quoting Alerman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969)).
85

Id. at 490 (holding that the “[a]pplication of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding process
and often frees the guilty”).
86

Id. at 489, 493-94.

87

Id. at 493.
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officers would likely have little fear that this delayed review would uncover illegal activity
undetected at trial and on direct appeal.88 Whatever deterrent effect collateral review might have,
the Court concluded, “would be outweighed by the acknowledged costs to other values vital to a
rational system of criminal justice.”89
The Court then noted that this balance tipped even further against habeas review in
search-and-seizure cases because “in . . . a typical Fourth Amendment claim, asserted on
collateral attack, a convicted defendant is usually asking society to redetermine an issue that has
no bearing on the basic justice of his incarceration.”90 Because such a habeas proceeding does
not help “assure that no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty” it amounts to
an entirely unjustifiable intrusion “on values important to our system of government.”91
D. Collateral Review of Fourth Amendment Claims After Stone
The Stone decision significantly narrowed federal habeas review of search-and-seizure
claims. Despite conflicting circuit court interpretations of the full-and-fair-hearing standard,92
the Supreme Court has not heard a Fourth Amendment claim on habeas since Stone. The lower
courts, while differing as to verbal formulations, have generally interpreted Stone’s preclusive
effect broadly to block federal consideration of any search-and-seizure claim except in the most

88

Id. at 493.

89

Id. at 494.

90

Id. at 491 n. 31.

91

Id.

92

Shoemaker v. Riley, 549 U.S. 948, 948-49 (1982) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (pointing out that the federal circuit courts had adopted different standards for
determining whether state proceedings met the full-and-fair-hearing requirement).
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extreme situations.93
II. Identifying Stone’s Grounds for Denying Habeas Review of Fourth Amendment Claims
Although Stone’s holding was clear, its rationale was not.94 Beginning with Justice
Brennan’s dissent,95 many speculated that the case presaged a dramatic narrowing of the scope of
federal habeas corpus.96 A post-Stone court could reasonably have denied habeas review to any
claim:

93

Although one commentator has argued that after Stone “[t]he enforcement of the
exclusionary rule in habeas corpus has ground to a halt,” Yackle, supra n. 2, at 2400, a handful
of habeas courts have reached the merits of claims after concluding that the petitioners before
them did not receive a full-and-fair hearing in state court. See, e.g., Herrera v. LeMaster, 225
F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding state court failure to apply federal harmless error
standard constituted denial of full and fair hearing under Stone); Riley v. Gray, 674 F.2d 522,
527 (6th Cir. 1982) (same where state appellate court failed to remand after rejecting claim on
ground not litigated in trial court); Doescher v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1982) (same were
state court failed to address retroactively applicable U.S. Supreme Court precedent on point);
Boyd v. Mintz, 631 F.2d 247, 250-51 (3rd Cir. 1980) (same where state provided insufficient time
for defense counsel to file motion to suppress); Gamble v. Oklahoma 583 F.2d 1161, 1165-66
(10th Cir. 1978) (same where state failed to apply controlling legal standard). But the standards
have not always been consistent. For a systematic review of the lower courts’ application of
Stone see Janet Boeth Jones, What Constitutes "An Opportunity for Full and Fair Litigation" in
State Court Precluding Habeas Corpus Review under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 in Federal Court of
State Prisoner's Fourth Amendment Claims, 75 A.L.R. Fed. 9 (2005) (collecting cases); Halpern,
supra n. 2, at 18-27 (same).
94

Soloff, supra n. 2, at 303-04 (criticizing the Court for failing to “articulate[] any theory
relevant to the purposes of habeas corpus jurisdiction” and suggesting possible rationales).

95

Stone, 428 U.S. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing Stone “as a harbinger of
future eviscerations of the habeas statutes . . .”).
96

Yackle, supra n. 2, at 2401 (explaining that many habeas scholars “worried at the time
[Stone was decided] that other claims, too, would soon receive the same treatment – at least
claims that, like the exclusionary rule, were subject to being recast as nonconstitutional
prophylactics, serving interests other than protecting the innocent from wrongful conviction”);
Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the
Court, 86 Yale L.J. 1035, 1086 (1977) (suggesting that Stone presaged a limitation on all habeas
review of claims unrelated to factual innocence).
24

(1) in which the state provided an opportunity for a full and fair hearing because federal review
of such a case would offend comity interests;97
(2) that did not undermine confidence in the guilt determination because denying review could
cause no injustice;98 or
(3) where the remedy constituted a prophylactic devise designed to protect constitutional values
rather than directly remedy a constitutional violation.99
A narrower reading interpreted Stone as limiting habeas review only when its costs significantly
outweighed its benefits, a rationale that would be unlikely to extend beyond search-and-seizure
claims.100

97

Id. at 474-82, 491 n.31 (reviewing history of habeas review and arguing that it had been
much more deferential to the decision of state courts); Louis M. Seidman, Factual Guilt and the
Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 Colum. L.
Rev. 436, 458-59 (1980) (reading Stone’s full-and-fair-hearing requirement as supportive of the
view that “the legal judgment of a federal judge [should not be substituted] for that of a state
judge in the absence of reason to think that the federal judgment is any more likely to be free
from error”).
98

Stone, 428 U.S. at 491 (noting that habeas is intended to provide a remedy for those
“‘grievously wronged,’” while in “a typical Fourth Amendment claim, asserted on collateral
attack, a convicted defendant is usually asking society to redetermine an issue that has no bearing
on the basic justice of his incarceration”); id. at 494 n. 37 (quoting Justice Black’s argument that
“ordinarily the evidence seized can in no way have been rendered untrustworthy . . . and indeed
often . . . alone establishes beyond virtually any shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guilty.”);
Yackle, supra n. 2, at 2400.
99

Id. at 482-94 (explaining that “[t]he exclusionary rule was a judicially created means of
effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment” and that it is “not a personal
constitutional right”); Yackle, supra n. 2, at 2400; Halpern, supra n. 2, at 38-39 (explaining that
“Stone provides a doctrinal basis for limiting or banning habeas review of claims asserted under
the Miranda or Wade rule” though arguing that the Court should not do so).
100

Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103 (1980) (“This Court in Stone assessed the costs and
benefits of the judge-made exclusionary rule within the boundaries of the federal courts' statutory
power to issue writs of habeas corpus, and decided that the incremental deterrent effect that the
25

In a series of cases decided over the decade and a half following Stone, the Court ruled
out each of the broad rationales for the Stone rule, leaving only the narrow, Fourth-Amendmentspecific, reading.101
A. The Court Rejects the Broad Federal-State Comity Rationale
In Jackson v. Virginia,102 the Court considered whether a federal habeas court could
review a claim that the evidence in a state criminal trial was insufficient to permit a jury to find
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Relying on Stone, the state argued that federal
habeas review should be denied. Permitting collateral review, it contended, would “duplicate the
work of the state appellate courts, . . .disserve the societal interest in the finality of state criminal
proceedings, and . . . increase friction between the federal and state judiciaries.”103
The Court rejected the state’s argument, and thus the broad comity-based reading of
Stone, explaining that federal review will always impact comity interests. A state must point to a
specific problem arising from federal review of a particular type of claim to limit the scope of
habeas. Search-and-seizure issues are fact-specific and involve subtle application of a variety of
Fourth Amendment rules. By contrast, sufficiency of the evidence claims can be resolved on a

issuance of the writ in Fourth Amendment cases might have on police conduct did not justify the
cost the writ imposed upon the fair administration of criminal justice.”); Yackle, supra n. 2, at
2400.
101

The Court has repeatedly cited to a final footnote in Stone – declaring that its "decision ...
[was] not concerned with the scope of the habeas corpus statute as authority for litigating
constitutional claims generally,” Stone, at 395 n.7, – to reject efforts to extend its holding beyond
search-and-seizure claims. Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 376; Rose, 433 U.S. at 560.
102

443 U.S. 307 (1979).

103

Id. at 321.
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written record and turn on a single, well understood principle. A federal court would thus rarely
overturn a state court judgment on such a claim, and the review process would be only minimally
intrusive.104
The Jackson Court left open the possibility that Stone might still limit habeas review of a
claim that did not cast doubt on the defendant’s guilt. “The constitutional issue presented in this
case is far different,” the Court explained, “from the kind of issue that was the subject of the
Court's decision in Stone . . .[because t]he question whether a defendant has been convicted upon
inadequate evidence is central to the basic question of guilt or innocence.”105 Three days later,
the Court had rejected that rationale as well.106
B. The Court Rejects the Factual Innocence Rationale
In Rose v. Mitchell, the defendant challenged his conviction on the ground that the state
had discriminated in the selection of his grand jury forum.107 Two years earlier, Justice Powell
had suggested in a concurring opinion that Stone should control grand jury discrimination
claims.108 In Rose, the state followed Justice Powell’s suggestion, arguing that, because a
collateral grand jury discrimination claim did not undermine the reliability of the guilt

104

Id. at 322.

105

Id. at 322.

106

Jackson, 443 U.S. 307 was decided on June 29, 1979, and Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545
(1979), came down on July 2, 1979.

107

443 U.S. 545, 547 (1979).

108

Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 508 n.1 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that a
“strong case may be made that claims of grand jury discrimination are not cognizable on federal
habeas corpus after Stone” because they go only to the “moot determination by the grand jury
that there was sufficient cause to proceed to trial [rather than to some] flaw in the trial itself”).
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determination, it should not be cognizable on habeas review. Like the exclusionary rule, the
benefits of reversing a conviction for discrimination in the selection of a grand jury, the state
argued, were “outweighed by the acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational system of
criminal justice.”109
Not surprisingly, Justice Powell, in an opinion joined only by Justice Rehnquist, agreed
with the state’s argument.110 “Properly understood,” he asserted, “the rationale of our decision in
Stone . . . actually presages . . . a limitation on habeas corpus” relief for grand jury discrimination
claims.111 Like illegal searches and seizures, grand jury discrimination has nothing “to do with
the guilt or innocence of the prisoner.”112
A majority of the Court disagreed, explaining that Stone rested on the “minimal utility” of
applying “the judicially created exclusionary rule” in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.113
Grand jury discrimination claims, the Court held, were “fundamentally” different.114 Search-andseizure claims challenge police conduct. But the state court itself is responsible for grand jury
109

Rose, 443 U.S.. at 559-60 (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 508 n.1 (1977)
(Powell, J., dissenting)).
110

Id. at 580-88 (Powell, J., dissenting).

111

Id. at 588 n. 10.

112

Id. Powell continued to make this argument after Rose. Vasquez v. Hillary, 474 U.S.
254, 279 n.10 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting).

113

Rose, 443 U.S. at 560; id. at 561 (“whereas the Fourteenth Amendment by its terms
always has been directly applicable to the States, the Fourth Amendment and its attendant
exclusionary rule only recently have been applied fully to the States.”); id. at 562 (explaining that
in Stone the Court “found that the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule was not enhanced by
the possibility that a ‘conviction obtained in state court and affirmed on direct review might be
overturned in collateral proceedings often years after the incarceration of the defendant’”).
114

Id.
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selection.115 While police might not be deterred by an extra level of habeas review of their
conduct, state courts would likely perceive a significant deterrent to continued discrimination by
the threat of federal review.116
Rose has been read to reject the broad claim that Stone presaged a general rule that habeas
review was appropriate only for petitioners claiming factual innocence.117 The Court left open
the possibility, however, that Stone might still apply to constitutional claims that would require
the exclusion of probative evidence of guilt. The integrity of the judicial system is challenged
when a discrimination claim is filed, the Rose Court stressed, in a way that it is not when a court
simply admits reliable, albeit illegally obtained, evidence.118 Moreover, because no evidence is
suppressed when a conviction is reversed for jury discrimination, the Court emphasized that the
defendant is more likely to be convicted on re-trial.119
In Kimmelman v. Morrison,120 the Court held that habeas review was appropriate even
where granting the writ would require a new trial without certain probative evidence. The
115

Id. at 561. The Court also stressed that the equal protection values at stake in Rose could
be applied to the states without the concerns about federal intervention the accompany the
exclusionary rule. Id. at 562, 564.
116

Id. at 563 (“Federal habeas review is necessary to ensure that constitutional defects in the
state judiciary’s grand jury selection procedure are not overlooked by the very state judges who
operate that system.”).
117

Louis M. Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity
and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 436, 454 (1980) (reading Rose “as a firm
and explicit repudiation of a restructuring of habeas jurisdiction along guilt and innocence
lines”).
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Rose, 443 U.S. at 563.

119

Id. at 564.

120

477 U.S. 365 (1986).
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defendant argued that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a
meritorious suppression motion, and the state countered that Stone precluded such a claim on
habeas.121 The Court rejected that argument, explaining that Stone rested on the exclusionary
rule’s character as a judicially created structural remedy to deter police misconduct.122 Given the
Court’s history of applying the rule to particular circumstances based on the costs and benefits of
doing so, Stone stands for the narrow proposition that the use of the exclusionary rule in
collateral proceedings – like its use in grand jury proceedings – would impose costs far
exceeding any incremental benefits.123 Since the right to counsel is the most vital of personal
trial rights, the Court explained, it stood on a much different ground.124 And the possibility that
federal enforcement of that right could require re-trial without probative evidence, the Court
emphasized, did not limit the scope of habeas review.125
C. The Court Rejects The Prophylactic Rule/Extra-Constitutional Remedy Rationale
Almost as soon as Stone was decided, speculation began about whether the Court would
impose similar limits on habeas review of Miranda claims.126 The similarities between Mapp
121

Id. at 375.
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Id. at 375-76.

123

Id. at 376.

124

Id. at 375-76.

125

Id. at 379-80.
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The Court’s 1966 decision had held that the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on compelled
self-incrimination applied to pre-trial interrogation and imposed a new rule that the police must
warn a suspect subjected to custodial interrogation of his right to remain silent and to an attorney.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Shortly after Stone was decided, states began to argue
that the Miranda rules, like the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, should not be enforced
collaterally. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 n.11 (1977) (flagging issue but not reaching
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and Miranda were obvious – both the Fourth and Fifth Amendment exclusionary rules were
extra-constitutional doctrines designed to serve a Constitutional value other than reliably
determining guilt or innocence in a particular case.127 Indeed, in some ways, the Miranda rule
was an even stronger candidate for limited habeas review. The Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule only applied where the police had in fact conducted an illegal search or seizure. The
Miranda rule applied whenever the police failed to provide the required warnings, even if the
excluded statements were voluntary and the police therefore did not violate the Selfincrimination Clause.128
After waiting 17 years to address the issue, the Court refused to extend Stone to Miranda
claims.129 Writing for the Court in Withrow v. Williams,130 Justice Souter delimited the
continuing scope of Stone: “We simply concluded . . . that the costs of applying the exclusionary

it because Miranda claim procedurally defaulted); Richardson v. Stone, 421 F. Suppp. 577, 57879 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (applying Stone to a Miranda claim).
127

Justice O’Connor articulated the argument for applying the Stone rule to Miranda claims
in two opinions. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 206-12 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(arguing that same cost benefit analysis with respect to enforcing the exclusionary rule on habeas
applied to both types of cases); Withrow, 507 U.S. at 702 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
128

Withrow, 507 U.S. at 702-03 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (“The Court recognized that these procedural safeguards were not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the right
against compulsory self-incrimination was protected.”); but see Dickerson v. United States, 530
U.S. 428, 438 (2000) (holding that Miranda rule is constitutionally based).
129

Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 201 n.3 (1989); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 87 n.
11 (1977).
130

507 U.S. 680, 683 (1993).
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rule on collateral review outweighed any potential advantage to be gained by applying it there.”131
The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not remedy the unconstitutional invasion of
privacy, and it virtually always undermines the truth-seeking process. By contrast, the Miranda
rules (1) directly address a constitutional concern with the use of compelled testimony at trial,
and (2) systemically improve the truth-seeking process by discouraging coerced, and therefore
unreliable, statements.132 Although in particular cases, Miranda undoubtedly requires the
exclusion of reliable, probative statements, the system’s reliability is enhanced by careful
safeguards against involuntary confessions.133 The Court thus rejected the last broad rationale for
Stone.
D. Articulating the Remaining Rationale for Stone
In Withrow, the last decision interpreting Stone, the Court explained that habeas review of
Fourth Amendment claims was inappropriate because applying the exclusionary rule collaterally
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Id. at 686. In Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 347-48 (1994), a plurality of the Court, in a
portion of the opinion that was not criticized by any of the other opinions, echoed this view:
“Our opinion in Stone concentrated on ‘the nature and purpose of the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule.’ The Court emphasized that its decision confined the exclusionary rule, not the
scope of §§ 2254 generally.” Emphasizing that it had “repeatedly declined to extend the rule in
Stone beyond its original bounds," the Court refused to rely on Stone in holding habeas relief
inapplicable to a non-constitutional claim. Id. at 348.
132

Id. at 691-92.

133

Id. at 692 (“[A] system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the
confession will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system relying
on independent investigation.” (internal quotations deleted) quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 488 n. 23 (1974)). The Court also concluded that addressing Miranda claims on
habeas did little to expand the burdens of the federal courts or insult state courts because habeas
challenges based on the voluntariness of the confession would continue. Id. at 693-95.
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would “only marginally advance” the rule’s deterrent function.134 By contrast, Justice Souter
wrote, “the costs of applying the exclusionary rule on habeas were comparatively great.”135 In
addition to the costs always incurred when excluding reliable evidence of guilt, applying the rule
on habeas would “intrude upon the public interest in ‘(i) the most effective utilization of limited
judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal trials, (iii) the minimization of friction
between our federal and state systems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional
balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded.’”136
This litany is an accurate reflection of the Stone opinion, but incredibly short on
particulars. Each factor is a relevant concern with any federal habeas claim, and even taken
together they cannot explain why habeas review should be open to all constitutional claims
except for those arising under the Fourth Amendment. The Stone majority conceded that the
exclusionary rule’s costs, though high, were justified during the direct criminal process.137 As
Justice Brennan pointed out in his Stone dissent, collateral review would not increase those costs,
because they “[s]hould already have been incurred . . . if the state court had not misapplied
federal constitutional principles.”138
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Id. at 686.

135

Id. at 686-87.

136

Id. at 687 (quoting Stone, 428 U.S. at 491 n. 31, and Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 259
(Powell, J., concurring)).
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Stone, 428 U.S. at 493 (“We adhere to the view that these considerations support the
implementation of the exclusionary rule at trial and its enforcement on direct appeal of statecourt convictions.”).
138

Stone, 428 U.S. at 512 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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As of 1976, however, there were reasons to conclude that search-and-seizure claims
would impose significantly greater costs on habeas than at trial or on direct appeal. The benefits
of the exclusionary rule are likely to be reduced in collateral proceedings because the type of
meritorious Fourth Amendment claim most likely to survive direct review would have been the
least likely to deter illegal police conduct. The Stone Court did not explore this reduced benefit,
relying instead on a conclusory assertion that the incremental deterrent effect of excluding
evidence on collateral review would be too small to justify the social costs.139 In Schneckloth,
however, Justice Powell had explained that “[s]erious fourth amendment infractions” would
likely be identified by state courts or the U.S. Supreme Court on direct review.140 The claims that
remain for habeas, he argued, “are most likely to be in [a] grey, twilight area, where the law is
difficult for courts to apply, let alone for the policeman on the beat to understand. This is
precisely the type of case where the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule is least
efficacious, and where there is the least justification for freeing a duly convicted defendant.”141
These costs of exclusion also increase on collateral review because of the difficulty of
engaging in the specific fact-finding necessary to resolve a search-and-seizure claim long after
the original suppression hearing.142 Stone makes only a passing reference to this cost in stating
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Stone, 428 U.S. at 493-94.

140

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 269-70 (Powell, concurring).

141

Id. at 269-70 (Powell, concurring).
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Justice Brennan does address the temporal distinction between direct and collateral
review, arguing that it is insufficient to support distinct constitutional rules “particularly in light
of the differential speed with which criminal cases proceed even on direct appeal.” Stone, 428
U.S. at 509 n.8. Still, habeas review holds the potential for extremely long delays that raise
special problems in factually intensive Fourth Amendment cases. Michael, supra n. 2, at 255-56
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that collateral review occurs “often . . . years after the incarceration of the defendant.”143 Again,
however, Justice Powell’s Schneckloth concurrence identified these costs, stressing the
difficulties posed by delayed fact finding both for the habeas court resolving the collateral claim
and for any re-trial that might be necessary.144 Recognizing that similar costs apply to any habeas
claim, he explained that they are likely to be more pronounced in Fourth Amendment cases:
“[T]he validity of a search-and-seizure claim frequently hinges on a complex matrix of events
which may be difficult indeed for the habeas court to disinter especially where, as often happens,
the trial occurred years before the collateral attack and the state record is thinly sketched.”145
In his opinion for the D.C. Circuit in Thornton, Judge Leventhal, as usual, articulated this
concern most persuasively:
“The ascertainment of what constituted ‘probable cause,’ typically a subtle and indeed
elusive question, is made incomparably more difficult and often artificial as recollections
dim and witnesses are unavailable. The difficulty is not eradicated by noting that [in a
collateral proceeding] the accused would have the burden of proof. The narration of the
events which he now provides, after protracted and intense rumination, may
unwarrantedly overshadow the cloudy recall of officers for whom this was but one case
among hundreds. When the inquiry is made at trial or seasonably ordered on direct
appeal, there is enough proximity to the problem to permit at least the probability of a
searching inquiry. But postpone the adjudication until some collateral proceeding years
hence and the examination is likely to be phantasmic.”146

(recognizing re-determination of facts as most serious concern at issue in Stone).
143

Stone, 428 U.S. at 493. The quoted language is used to support the argument that the
deterrent effect on police would be reduced in habeas proceedings, rather than to show that
Fourth Amendment claims are harder to address collaterally than other claims.
144

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 261 (Powell, concurring) (citing Anthony Amsterdam, Search,
Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 378, 383-84 (1964)).
145

Id. at 263 (Powell, concurring).

146

Thornton, 368 F.2d at 828.
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This combination of uncertainties on both the law and the facts provides the best justification for
the Stone rule.
III. Undermining the Remaining Rationale For Stone
As of 1976, the exclusionary rule required courts to suppress all illegally obtained
evidence; a federal habeas petition could be filed at virtually any time;147 and de novo review was
required.148 In the three decades since the Court decided Stone, much has changed in the
application of the exclusionary rule and even more significantly with respect to habeas corpus
law. This part reviews those changes and concludes that the cost/benefit calculus on which Stone
was grounded has changed so dramatically that the rule announced in that case can no longer be
justified.
A. The Cost of the Exclusionary Rule is Reduced by The Good Faith Exception
Since 1976, the Court has narrowed the scope of the exclusionary rule by adopting a good
faith exception. In the years before Stone, the Court had quite aggressively overturned
convictions in which it determined that searches had rested on warrants not providing probable

147

As of 1976, the only limitation on the timing of filing a habeas corpus petition was found
in Rule 9 of the Federal Habeas Corpus Rules, which permitted a court to dismiss a habeas
petition when a state could demonstrate that it "has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the
petition by delay in its filing." 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Rule 9. That ground for dismissal, however,
did not apply to cases where the state would be prejudiced by delay in its ability to retry the
prisoner if the writ were granted. Vasquez v. Hillary, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986).
148

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1976) (“since Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443
(1953), it has been the rule that the federal habeas petitioner who claims he is detained pursuant
to a final judgment of a state court in violation of the United States Constitution is entitled to
have the federal habeas court make its own independent determination of his federal claim,
without being bound by the determination on the merits of that claim reached in the state
proceedings.”).
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cause.149 In 1984, the Court held that the exclusionary rule was not constitutionally required
when the executing officers acted in objectively reasonable good faith reliance on a validly
issued warrant.150 Subsequent cases extended the rule to warrantless police intrusions that were
authorized in advance by a statute subsequently held unconstitutional151 and by an expired
warrant that, because of a court clerk’s error, reasonably appeared valid to the arresting
officers.152 By excluding some good faith police miscues, these decisions limited the cost of the
exclusionary rule by focusing it on cases in which police engaged in more-readily-deterrable
illegal conduct.
B. Judicial Changes in Habeas Law Reduce the Cost of Applying the Exclusionary Rule
Collaterally
Even more significantly, after Stone, the Court restricted the scope of federal habeas
review. As of 1976, courts addressed all claims defaulted in state court, unless the petitioner
deliberately bypassed an avenue for relief, and successive petitions if the interests of justice
would be served by granting relief. Many new cases applied retroactively, and all constitutional
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Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969);
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964);
Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960);
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
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United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (concluding “that the marginal or
nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable
reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of
exclusion.”); see Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (applying good faith exception
where officers acted in reasonable good faith on a search warrant that was defective because the
reviewing judge failed to make necessary clerical corrections).
151

Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).

152

Arizona v. Hicks, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
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errors required reversal unless the state could prove that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Twenty years later, all of this law has changed in ways that dramatically limit
the scope of habeas review. The following subsections briefly explain each change.
1. Defaulted Claims
In Fay v. Noia, the Court held that a federal habeas court must reach the merits of a
constitutional claim unless the defendant deliberately by-passed an avenue for relief in state
court.153 Beginning in the late 1970s, the Court altered that standard, holding that a federal court
should as a prudential matter decline to reach defaulted claims unless the defendant could
demonstrate both (1) cause attributable to the state for the failure to raise the claim;154 and (2)
actual prejudice as a result of the alleged constitutional error.155 A narrow exception was also
recognized for petitioners who could show that they were probably innocent.156
2. Successive Petitions
In Sanders v. United States,157 the Court held that a federal habeas court could issue the
writ on a successive petition whenever the “ends of justice demand.”158 A 1966 amendment to
153

Fay, 372 U.S. at 438.

154

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 491-92 (1986); Isaac v. Engle, 456 U.S. 107, 129-34

(1982).
155

Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494; United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982).

156

Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496 (“where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the
absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default”). The Court has been quite strict in
interpreting these tests to prevent federal habeas courts from reaching defaulted claims. Dugger
v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 406-10 & n.6 (1989).
157

373 U.S. 1 (1963).

158

Id. at 18.
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the habeas statute eliminated any reference to the ends of justice and purported to require the
dismissal of successive petitions where the petitioner “deliberately withheld the newly asserted
ground or otherwise abused the writ.”159 Congress, however, never defined the concept of abuse
of the writ, and courts continued to recognize an ends-of-justice exception.160
In 1991, the Court abandoned its flexible approach to successive petitions and adopted
the same cause-and-prejudice standard that it had previously applied to defaulted claims.161 A
narrow actual-innocence exception was deemed adequate to replace Sanders broad ends-ofjustice inquiry.162
3. Retroactivity
Beginning with Linkletter in 1965, the Court decided whether a new rule of constitutional
law would apply retroactively by considering (1) the purposes of the exclusionary rule, (2) the
state’s reliance on an old rule, and (3) the effect of applying the new rule on the administration of
the criminal justice system.163 These decisions limited the retroactive effect of the Court’s most
sweeping decisions,164 but many cases were applied retroactively either because they merely
159

28 U.S.C. § 2244(a)-(c); see S.Rep. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1966); see also
H.R.Rep. No. 1892, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 5-6 (1966), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1966, pp.
3663, 3664.
160

See Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (recognizing continuing validity of ends-ofjustice exception and addressing merits of second petition).
161

McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 490-96 (1991).

162

Id. at 495.
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E.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967).

164

Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638 (1984) (refusing to apply retroactively rule requiring
police questioning to stop if suspect requests an attorney); U.S. v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975)
(refusing to apply retroactively decision overturning statute permitting roving border patrol
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interpreted prior law,165 or because they enhanced the truth-seeking process.166
In the late 1980s, the Court revised its retroactivity rules to prevent federal habeas courts
from applying virtually any case retroactively.167 The Court accomplished this by adopting a
bright-line rule prohibiting the retroactive application of all “new rules” and defining the concept
of a new rule expansively to include virtually any new decision that was not strictly dictated by
prior law.168
searches without probable cause); Desist v. U.S., 394 U.S. 244 (1969); (refusing to apply
retroactively new rule prohibiting electronic surveillance without a warrant); De Stefano v.
Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (refusing to apply new federal right to jury trial retroactively);
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 727 (1966) (refusing to apply Miranda rule retroactively);
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967) (refusing to apply right to counsel at line-ups
retroactively); Tehan v. U.S. ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966) (refusing to apply retroactively
rule that prosecutor or judge may not comment on defendant’s failure to testify); Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-40 (1965) (refusing to apply Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
retroactively).
165

Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 216-17 (1988) (applying decision retroactively because it
applied the existing rule of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979)); Francis v. Franklin,
471 U.S. 307, 309 (1985) (same); Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 561, 564 (1971) (applying
a 1969 decision on habeas to case that became final in 1966); id. at 574 n.4 (Black, J., dissenting)
(chastising majority for applying recent decision retroactively); see also Desist, 394 U.S. at 26263 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (explaining that decisions merely applying existing standards do not
raise retroactivity concerns); United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549 (1982) (stating that
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), would apply retroactively because it merely
applied prior law with respect to the dissipation of the taint of an unlawful seizure).
166

See, e.g., Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977) (applying retroactively rule
that state must prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt); Ivan V. V. City of
New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972) (applying requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
retroactively); Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968) (applying Burton rule retroactively);
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n. 22 (1968) (applying juror-exclusion rules for death
penalty cases retroactively).
167

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion).

168

Teague, 489 U.S. at 301; id. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Few decisions on appeal or
collateral review are ‘dictated’ by what came before. Most such cases involve a question of law
that is at least debatable, permitting a rational judge to resolve the case in more than one way.
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4. Harmless Error
In 1967, the Court first recognized that a court need not reverse a conviction whenever
the trial was plagued with federal constitutional error if the government could demonstrate
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant would have been convicted absent the violation.169
For many years, the Court assumed that this standard applied on collateral review.170 In the
1990s, the Court adopted a broader harmless error standard for habeas cases, holding that a
federal court could grant the writ only if the constitutional violation “had substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the juries’ verdict.”171
C. The Cumulative Effect of Judicial Changes in Habeas Law
All of the changes in habeas corpus law between 1976 and the mid-1990s, combined with
the Court’s adoption of the good faith exception, reduced the costs of applying the Fourth

Virtually no case that prompts a dissent on the relevant legal point, for example, could be said to
be ‘dictated’ by prior decisions.”). For applications of this new rule doctrine see Butler v.
McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990), Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990), and Sawyer v. Smith,
497 U.S. 227, 228 (1990). The Teague Court did purport to recognize two exceptions to its nonretroactivity rule for decisions that place conduct beyond the power of the criminal law to
proscribe and for bedrock principles of criminal procedure. Since Teague was decided, however,
the Court has never recognized a new rule that falls within these exceptions. Teague, 489 U.S. at
312-14.
169

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
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See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 (1991); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986);
Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972); Anderson v. Nelson, 390 U.S. 523 (1968) (per
curiam ).
171

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 627 (1993). Compare O’Neal v. McAninch, 513
U.S. 432 (1995) (permitting habeas court to grant the writ only if constitutional error “had
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the juries’ verdict”) with Chapman,
386 U.S. at 24 (treating constitutional error as harmless on direct review only if prosecution
bears burden of showing error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
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Amendment exclusionary rule in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Despite these innovations,
in 1995 habeas petitions could still be filed years after a conviction became final,172 and de novo
review could still lead to the exclusion of evidence in warrantless search-and-seizure cases, even
if the police acted in good faith. To be sure, the doctrinal changes ensured that there would be
fewer successful claims. But one could still make the case that the potential for significant costs,
and the questionable prospect for meaningful benefits, still justified the Stone rule.
D. Legislative Changes in Habeas Law
In 1996, Congress effectively dealt a death blow to whatever was left of Stone’s rationale
in enacting the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. The new amendments to the
habeas statute imposed significant additional restrictions on collateral review. First, Congress
adopted a strict one-year statute of limitations, thereby preventing virtually all old cases with
stale facts from arising on habeas.173 This amendment significantly reduced the cost of
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In 1989, for example, Justice O’Connor argued that the Court should apply Stone to
Miranda claims reasoning that “[e]xcluding probative evidence years after trial, when a new trial
may be a practical impossibility, will often result in the release of an admittedly guilty individual
who may pose a continuing threat to society.” Duckworth, 492 U.S.. at 211 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
173

The new language read: “A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a
writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of – (A) the date on which the judgment became final
by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (B) the
date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing
by such State action; (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court
and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (D) the date on which the
factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The one-year limitation period is tolled
during properly filed state collateral review proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
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potentially erroneous decisions granting the writ that could result from faded memories and
unavailable witnesses.
Second, the amendments prohibited a federal habeas court from granting the writ unless
“the state court judgment resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented.”174 By replacing the de novo standard of review with this
reasonableness standard in all cases, the amendment ensured that habeas review would lead to
the suppression of evidence only when the police conduct violated clearly established law.175
Those cases would be precisely the ones in which the added threat of collateral review would be

The amendments limited the scope of the writ in other significant ways as well. (1) State
court fact findings are presumed correct unless the applicant can rebut the finding by clear and
convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). (2) The applicant’s failure to develop a claim in
state court will bar an evidentiary hearing unless the claim is based on a new, retroactively
applicable rule of constitutional law or the factual predicate could not reasonably have been
discovered through due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A). The only exception to this rule is
for situations in which facts would be sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that
but for constitutional error, “no reasonable fact-finder would have found the applicant guilty of
the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B).
174

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

175

This interpretation of the AEDPA was not the only plausible one. In Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362 (2000), the Court split 5-4 on what this language meant. The majority held the new
amendment limited the federal courts’ authority to grant the writ to cases in which state courts
“unreasonably appl[y]” federal law in an objective sense to be determined by the federal courts
according “to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id. at 414. The four justices in the minority
concluded that the 1996 Amendment required federal courts to “give state courts' opinions a
respectful reading, and to listen carefully to their conclusions, but when the state court addresses
a legal question, it is the law 'as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States' that
prevails." Id. at 387 (Steven, J., concurring in judgment). For a fuller defense of the minority
view see Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 Buffalo L. Rev. 381,
411-13 (1996).
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most likely to pose a significant incremental deterrent for the police.
IV. The Statutory Interpretation Critique
The argument advanced in this Article for overturning Stone, and placing Fourth
Amendment claims on the same footing as other federal constitutional claims on habeas review,
does not take account of traditional notions of statutory interpretation. One might reasonably
criticize this argument on the ground that Congress has set the federal courts’ jurisdiction in
habeas cases since 1789,176 and therefore any change in doctrine should assess Congressional
intent. This Part responds to that criticism in three ways, by showing that: (1) traditional notions
of statutory interpretation do not yield a determinate answer to the question whether Congress
intended the AEDPA to overturn Stone; (2) those who interpret the statute to retain Stone rely on
an erroneous reading of the case itself or the legislative history of the 1996 Act; and (3) given
that the Stone Court saw itself as interpreting the Constitution, new habeas legislation that does
not mention Stone should not preclude judicial reconsideration of the case.
A. Focusing on Congressional Intent in Enacting The AEDPA Yields No Determinate
Result
A court seeking in good faith to determine Congress’s intent in enacting the AEDPA with
respect to Stone could reasonably decide the issue either way. A conscientious judge could
reason that the act’s plain language permits a federal court to grant the writ if it finds that a state
court applied established federal constitutional law in an unreasonable way. Although the
legislative history did not address the Stone rule, Congress was aware of the full-and-fair-hearing
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1 Stat. 73, 81-82.
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standard.177 Where the plain language of a statute precludes the application of a pre-amendment
rule – in this case the Stone rule – a court can reasonably interpret the statute to overturn the
rule.178
A judge expanding the inquiry beyond the plain meaning of the statutory language could
reach a similar result. As Larry Yackle has persuasively shown in his primer on the AEDPA,
Congress focused squarely on the subsection of the statute defining the limits of federal power to
grant the writ, vigorously debating the appropriate level of deference that federal courts should
pay to state constitutional decisions.179 By omitting any reference to either the Stone rule, or
some other form of special treatment for Fourth Amendment claims, a judge could reasonably
interpret the Act to overturn Stone in favor of the general standard it imposed.
A judge willing to investigate the purpose behind the 1996 Act could also reasonably
conclude that Congress did not intend to overrule Stone. The overriding purpose of Section (d)
of the habeas statute was to increase the deference that federal court’s must pay to state court
decisions. Given the lack of specific consideration of the Stone rule in the legislative history, a
judge might reason, Congress’s decision to increase the deference paid to state court judgments
generally should not be interpreted to reduce the deference already paid to Fourth Amendment
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Cf. Exxon Mobile v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005) (holding that
supplemental jurisdictional statute’s unambiguous text overrules prior judge-made rule limiting
supplemental jurisdiction over diversity claims not meeting amount-in-controversy requirement);
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1992) (explaining that Congress may be presumed to
legislate with knowledge of prior judicial practice and ambiguous language should not be
interpreted to alter settled practice, but “where the language is unambiguous, silence in the
legislative history cannot be controlling”).
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decisions.
B. Erroneous Interpretations of the AEDPA
Judge Frank Easterbrook, in an opinion for the Seventh Circuit,180 and Michael Slade, in a
Harvard Journal on Legislation article,181 have interpreted the AEDPA to preserve the Stone rule.
Judge Easterbrook’s approach is faulty because he interprets Stone as a jurisdictional case,
although the Court itself explicitly rejected that interpretation. Slade fails to recognize that his
analysis is indeterminate because he fails to take full account of the legislative history, which
makes clear that Congress rejected the type of deference required by Stone in favor of the
alternative approach adopted in the 1996 Act.
1. Easterbrook’s Jurisdictional Analysis
Judge Easterbrook reads Stone as interpreting Section (a) of the habeas statute, which
grants jurisdiction to the federal courts when a state prisoner is held “in custody in violation of
the Constitution . . ..”182 In his view, Stone held that using evidence obtained pursuant to an
illegal search or seizure, while unconstitutional under Mapp, does not render the subsequent
custody unconstitutional under Section (a).183 “The seizure may have violated the Constitution,”
he wrote, “but the custody does not, because the exclusionary rule is a social device for deterring
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Michael B. Slade, Democracy in the Details: A Plea for Substance Over Form in
Statutory Interpretation, 37 Harv. J. Leg. 187, 223-35 (2000).
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official wrongdoing, not a personal right of defendants.”184 Following this reasoning,
Easterbrook concludes that the 1996 Act did not overrule Stone because the language limiting
review to unreasonable applications of federal law was placed in section (d) and thus applied
only to cases cognizable under Section (a). If Stone limited the scope of section (a), the 1996 Act
should not affect it.185
Judge Easterbrook’s attempt to save Stone fails because the Stone Court unequivocally
noted that its “decision does not mean that the federal court lacks jurisdiction over” a collateral
Fourth Amendment claim.186 Ignoring the language of Stone itself, Easterbrook cites – curiously
with a “see also” signal though he cites nothing else – the Court’s pre-1996-Act decision in Reed
v. Farley.187 But Reed too flatly contradicts Easterbrook’s reading of Stone by emphasizing that
the case “confined the exclusionary rule, not the scope of § 2254 generally.”188
The jurisdictional interpretation of Stone is also inconsistent with the case’s holding. If
the Court lacked habeas jurisdiction to hear exclusionary rule claims, Stone’s attempt to create an
exception where the state failed to provide a full and fair hearing would have been
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Id. at 563 (concluding that Stone “treats inaccurate administration of the exclusionary rule
as outside the scope of th[e habeas] statute”).
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Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. at 347-48 (quoting Stone, 428 U.S. at 495 n.37: “Our decision
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constitutional claims generally.”). The Court made the same observation about Stone at least
twice before Reed. Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 376; Rose, 433 U.S. at 560.
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impermissible.189 Yet, lower courts have occasionally exercised jurisdiction in these cases, and
neither the Court nor Congress has ever questioned it.190
2. Slade’s Legislative History Analysis
Michael Slade’s defense of Stone takes a different approach. His article is generally
critical of a purely textual approach to statutory interpretation.191 Unlike Easterbrook, Slade does
not try to show that Stone is consistent with the plain meaning of the 1996 Act’s text. Instead, he
argues that to preserve the important deliberative character of legislation, a court should look
beyond the text and “go through the background of the doctrine, describe why Congress
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Stone, 428 U.S. at 494.
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See, e.g., Herrera, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir. 2000); Riley v. Gray 674 F.2d 522, 527
(6th Cir. 1982); Doescher v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 285 (1982); Boyd v. Mintz, 631 F.2d 247, 250-51
(3rd Cir. 1980); Gamble v. Oklahoma 583 F.2d 1161, 1165-66 (1978).
Although the jurisdictional interpretation of Stone is indefensible, two other explanations
for the result fit comfortably with both the language and the holding of the case. First, as Robert
Cover and Alexander Aleinikoff have observed, Stone can be seen as a preclusion case in which
federal courts respect state court judgments on Fourth Amendment claims when the issue was, or
could have been, litigated in state court. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra n. 105, at 1076.
Alternatively, Stone can be read as one of a line of habeas decisions dating back to the
exhaustion-of-state-remedies rule in 1886 in which the Court declined to exercise its jurisdiction
for prudential reasons. See infra nn. 214-16. With respect to procedural defaults in state court,
for example, the Court has explained that its “decisions have uniformly acknowledged that
federal courts are empowered under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to look beyond a state procedural
forfeiture and entertain a state prisoner's contention that his constitutional rights have been
violated. . . . The more difficult question . . . is: What standards should govern the exercise of
the habeas court's equitable discretion in the use of this power?” Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9
(1984). As it did with Stone, in each of these situations the Court decided the standards that it
would use to determine when a federal court should – as opposed to could – reach the merits of a
particular claim. Congress sometimes adopted the Court’s rules in subsequent amendments to
the statute, but often not until decades after the Court announced the rules. For example, in 1948
Congress codified the exhaustion doctrine 60 years after the Court announced it. 62 Stat. 967.
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addressed the issue and the goals it desired to accomplish . . ..”192 The members of Congress
voted overwhelmingly in favor of granting additional deference to the state courts. Because the
full-and-fair-hearing rule requires federal deference to state courts, he concludes that the
“collective wisdom that produced” the Act dictates that Congress intended to retain Stone.193
One might criticize Slade’s method as overly subjective. But even accepting it as an
appropriate way to interpret statutes, he undervalues the evidence that Congress intended
precisely what the plain language of the AEDPA says. First, Congress had been considering
habeas reform legislation for many years, and virtually all of the recent proposals sought to
expand the Stone full-and-fair-hearing rule to other constitutional violations.194 The failure of
those bills to become law may have led the proponents of the 1996 Act to change their proposal
from the Stone rule’s focus on a fair hearing to the Act’s requirement of a result that is
reasonably consistent with federal law.195 Second, even within the debate leading up to the 1996
Act itself, the Senate considered proposals that would have required both more and less
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Yackle, supra n. 185, at 401-02 (“Both the Reagan and Bush Administrations proposed
that the federal courts should be barred from awarding habeas relief with respect to a claim that
has been "’fully and fairly adjudicated’ previously in state court.”).
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Larry Yackle carefully tracked the debate over habeas reform legislation, showing how its
proponents moved away from bills that would have limited federal review to cases in which
states failed to provide the opportunity for a full and fair hearing and settled instead on the
language of the 1996 Act which preserved substantive review. Yackle, supra n. 185, at 427-33.
Although the Supreme Court has interpreted the 1996 Act to require less deference to state court
decisions than Yackle believed was required, given the compromises made to achieve passage,
id. at 411-13, his basic point that Congress rejected a purely procedural form of habeas review in
favor of one retaining substantive content remains correct.
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deference than the language in the final bill.196 The proposal for less deference would have
effectively precluded federal habeas review whenever the state provided the sort of fair procedure
required by Stone. As Slade recognizes, neither alternative to the originally proposed language
was accepted.197 Congress’s deliberations thus show that it chose a particular form of deference,
one that Stone did not require: review of the substantive reasonableness of a state court decision.
By contrast, Stone explicitly prohibited all substantive review whenever the state provided a fair
procedure in which to litigate Fourth Amendment claims.
3. Stone’s Constitutional Underpinnings
Even if Easterbrook’s or Slade’s interpretations of the AEDPA were more persuasive,
they still would not save Stone because a traditional focus on Congressional intent is not an
appropriate means to test the continuing validity of a judge-made rule like that announced in
Stone. Habeas corpus legislation obviously existed in 1976 when the Court decided Stone,198 but
the majority opinion failed to mention the statute,199 except to note that “it [was] unnecessary to
consider” its scope.200 Instead, the Court treated its cost/benefit analysis as a matter of
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Constitutional interpretation – concluding that “the Constitution does not require that a state
prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.”201
Many have criticized Stone for breaking with established practice without Congressional
authorization.202 In 1966, after Mapp and Linkletter, Congress amended the habeas statute,
limiting the federal habeas courts’ discretion to hold evidentiary hearings, but not restricting the
scope of collateral review of Fourth Amendment claims.203 Over the next decade, the Court
regularly reviewed search-and-seizure claims on habeas, and Congress, despite considering
reform legislation, did not interfere.204
However unwise it may be, the Court’s practice of developing doctrine untethered to
anything in the language of the habeas statute has been par for the course.205 Despite the
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For a detailed discussion of proposed habeas reform legislation from the 1940s through
the early 1990s see Yackle, supra n. 2, at 2344-2373.
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Wright v. West, 502 U.S. 277 (1992) (Justice Thomas’s lead opinion and Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence debate the standard of review); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 7885 (1977) (describing the Court’s changing approach to the standard of review over time); Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 411-12 (1963) (explaining that the Court had not "always followed an
unwavering line in its conclusions as to the availability of the Great Writ. Our development of
the law of federal habeas corpus has been attended, seemingly, with some backing and filling.");
Jordan Streiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 303, 310-11 (1993)
(explaining that the Court has long defined the scope of its jurisdiction on habeas without
reference to the statutory language).
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jurisdictional statute’s clear, unequivocal, and functionally stable language,206 the Court has
repeatedly limited its scope on a variety of often-changing prudential grounds. During the
nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Court regularly asserted that federal courts should
review state cases on habeas only when the state court lacked jurisdiction.207 Through the first
half of the twentieth century, the Court gradually expanded the scope of its review, though the
statutory language never changed.208 Finally, in 1953, it held that all constitutional claims must
be reviewed de novo.209
In addition to the evolving scope of the writ, the Court adopted specific doctrines to limit
its jurisdiction in particular situations. In 1886, the Court began this process of defining the
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Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1976) (“since Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443
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scope of its own jurisdiction through prudential doctrines, holding that although federal
jurisdiction existed to remove state criminal cases to federal court, a habeas court ordinarily
should require a prisoner first to exhaust state court remedies.210 The Court subsequently defined
prudential limits on habeas review of procedurally defaulted constitutional claims211 and nonconstitutional federal law claims.212
Given that Stone, like many prior cases, ignored the text of the habeas statute, the costs
and benefits of the exclusionary rule and habeas corpus review – i.e. the considerations that
animated Stone – rather than traditional canons of statutory construction, are the more
appropriate ones in evaluating Stone’s continuing validity.
Conclusion
In the quarter century between Mapp and the AEDPA, the argument for distinguishing
collateral Fourth Amendment claims from the full gamut of constitutional claims had an
historical and logical basis that was stronger than Stone’s critics recognized. Whether Stone was
then correctly decided has now become a moot point. This Article shows that judicial and
legislative changes in the law have now undermined the old grounds for distinguishing search
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and seizure claims. And Stone should thus be overruled.
The number of cases affected by this result would no doubt be small. Nevertheless, in a
time of high concern about security, and Patriot-Act-like responses, the ideological impact of
reaffirming what Judge Leventhal described as “the magnitude of the Fourth Amendment in our
constitutional constellation”213 could hardly be more significant.
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